Our key manipulation was that on half the trials the participant was the financial beneficiary of the outcome of the decisions, while on the other half the beneficiary was another person. Until recently research has almost exclusively focused on decisions people make for themselves. Whilst these are likely to form the majority of decisions that we make, there are nonetheless a sizeable number of decisions we make for someone else in our personal, social and professional lives.
Would we expect to see a difference between decisions we make for ourselves compared to those we make for others? According to the risk-as-feeling hypothesis Loewenstein et al. Experiencing this visceral or somatic responses to risk puts the decision-maker into a hot state of cognition, but because of interpersonal empathy gaps the emotional response of another person to risk is underestimated Loewenstein As a consequence, it can be predicted that decision-makers would make decisions less influenced by the emotional response to risk for other people, in other words, decisions for self and others under risk would be different.
However, results from several studies investigating the difference between self and other risky decisions are far from clear-cut. Although differences is self-other decision making have been observed in non-financial risky decisions Stone and Allgaier ; Stone et al. Stone et al. This is perhaps counterintuitive, as the risk-as-feeling hypothesis would predict that with the reduced emotional impact of a decision where the outcome does not affect the decision maker, he or she becomes more risk seeking.
When predicting the decisions another person would make, participants were more risk seeking than in decisions made for themselves Hsee and Weber However, Hadar and Fischer found the opposite pattern: participants were more risk seeking in decisions made for themselves than predictions for others, especially when risks were high and the decisions were reciprocal.
And, in a third pattern, Benjamin and Robbins found no difference in risk seeking behaviour in self and other decisions in a task which involved hypothetical payoffs. Why might we see such differences in decisions made for another person? Ziegler and Tunney predicted that the relative social or emotional distance to other person plays a pivotal role. They asked participants to make a series of decisions, choosing between a smaller immediate reward and a larger delayed reward. When the decision was made for themselves participants were more impulsive than if the decision was made for more socially distant people.
Tunney and Ziegler submitted used this result in conjunction with a careful analysis of the surrogate decision-making literature to formulate the Somatic Distortion theory of surrogate decision-making, which attempts to capture the potential conflicts between the different perspectives one might encounter when making a decision on behalf of another person, along with the familiarity between decision-maker and recipient, and the individual differences in the factors that might affect perspective taking.
In doing so the model predicts when a decision made for another person is different from a decision made for ourselves. The model assumes that when making a decision on behalf of another person, the decision maker compares the preferred outcome from a number of different perspectives. The decision maker considers what they would do if they were the beneficiary of the decision, they simulate what they believe the beneficiary would choose, and what they believe what the best outcome for the beneficiary would be irrespective of their own wishes or the beneficiaries.
We refer to each perspective as Projected, Simulated, and Benevolent respectively. Of course, the decision-maker might simply decide what they would prefer to outcome to be irrespective of either the beneficiaries wishes, or indeed what they would chose if they were the beneficiary. In this egocentric scenario the decision maker does not attempt to make a surrogate decision and the theory does not apply.
In computing a decision from each perspective the decision maker makes an estimated utility judgment. Given that what we would choose might be different from what we think another person might choose, and that both perspective could be different again from what we believe the best choice the benevolent choice to be, the model includes a simple majority choice rule to decide what the actual surrogate decision would be.
Instances in the literature when participants were predicting what another person should e. Ziegler and Tunney or would e. Hsee and Weber do is not the same as making actual decisions on behalf of another person. Both the risk-as-feeling hypothesis Loewenstein et al. Seventy-three participants [19 males mean age Participants were presented with a variation of the financial decision-making task created by De Martino et al.
Participants were tested individually. They were told in one part of the experiment that they would receive the payoffs of their decisions and in the other part that the payoffs would go to another anonymous participant. Participants were not informed of the second part until they had completed the first and the order of parts was counterbalanced. On each trial, participants were first told the amount of money at stake e.
They were then presented with a sure option framed as a gain or loss of a fraction of the money at stake, e. The choices between the sure and gamble options in experimental trials were between a 20, 40, 60 or 80 percent chance of keeping all the money with the sure offer matched to obtain the same percentage of the initial offer, so that the sure offer and gamble offer were equal in expected value.
A further eight control trials with probabilities to keep all the money of five and 95 percent respectively acted as catch control trials. In one block participants made decisions for self and in the other block they made decisions for another, with a practice session prior to the first block.
Blocks were counterbalanced and participants were given no information about the second block of the experiment until the first was completed. Participants completed eight blocks of trials in the self and other conditions, each block consisting of four experimental, two filler and one catch trial. Each block was followed by interim feedback, indicating a running total of the amount of money won so far.
To ensure that risk seeking would occur Harinck et al. At the end of the session participants were paid the money they had won in the self-condition, and money they had won in the other condition was placed into an envelope to be handed to the next but one participant.
Participants received an envelope from the previous but one participant to make up their total pay. The first two participants therefore had to wait until the last and second to last participant had completed the experiment as their envelopes came from them. Figure 1 shows the percentages of risky choices made for self and other in both loss and gain frames.
These data were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors of Target of the decision with 2 levels self, other and Frame of the choice with 2 levels gain, loss. As a control the order of the conditions was entered as a between-subject factor. The Decision-Making task. Participants were first told the amount of money at stake e. In the experimental trials the utilities of the sure option and gamble option were equal.
Participants completed the task once for themselves panel A and once for an unknown other participant panel B with the wording of the framing reflecting this change in perspective. The susceptibility to the framing effect is best expressed as the difference of gambling choices made in the gain and loss frames; an increase in gambling choices in the loss frame signals risk seeking which is fundamental to the framing effect Tversky and Kahneman , The mean difference in risky choices made in the loss and gain frames for each target are shown in Figure 2.
The cognitive processes that individuals rely on are determined by both the properties of the object of judgment as well as characteristics of the observer. As it relates to object properties, Ferreira et al. Specifically, when participants were primed with formal problems derived from GRE problems before they responded to the base-rate problems, they were more likely to rely on analytic processing Ferreira et al.
Ferreira et al. Thomas and Sommers influenced the accessibility of relational processing of list items by presented lists of words grouped by semantic relationship. Making relational processing more accessible led to errors in memory.
Those memory errors were reduced in older adults when relational processing was made less accessible. As it relates to the characteristics of the observer, research has demonstrated that as we age, different aspects of the object of judgment change on some dimension of accessibility.
For example, empirical work has demonstrated that aging is associated with increased attention to emotional content. Carstensen and Turk-Charles found that older adults recalled relatively more emotional material as opposed to neutral material. This difference was not found in younger adults. This increased susceptibility has been attributed to processing information that is highly accessible but not necessarily useful to specific judgments. Thomas and Sommers demonstrated that older adults could reduce specific memory errors, but only when relational information was made less accessible.
Alternatively, younger adults were able to benefit from strategies that enhanced the accessibility of information the differentiated studied items, without reducing the accessibility of biasing information. The results of Thomas and Sommers demonstrate two important points. First, memory performance can be influenced by processing specific kinds of information. Second, older and younger adults may automatically rely on different cognitive processes. The present research examined whether older and younger adults would show similar changes in framing effect susceptibility as a result of manipulations that encouraged specific cognitive processes.
We were guided by findings from the episodic memory literature, which have demonstrated reductions in memory errors when older adults were explicitly encouraged to engage in controlled processes.
For example, Bulevich and Thomas n. Similarly, the framing effect was reduced when older adults were explicitly directed to provide a rationale for their choices before making the decision Kim et al. These results suggest that older adults, like younger adults, were capable of unbiased decision making; however, unlike younger adults, they required explicit direction. In the present study, we extend this research by investigating whether the framing effect could be reduced if older and younger adults were encouraged to engage in analytical processing.
In two experiments, younger and older adults were compared in their judgments of a series of monetary decisions framed in terms of gains or losses. In Experiment 1, we primed different cognitive processes in the decision task by having participants perform either a memory or a probability calculation orienting task concurrently with the decision task. Specifically, participants were asked to recall elements initial endowments from previous decision trials or compute outcomes from previous decision trails expected value.
In Experiment 2, we examined whether older adults could remember to engage in analytic processing if given instructions at the beginning of an experimental session. Experiment 1 examined whether biases in decision making that result from the way problems are framed could be eliminated if participants were primed to analyze expected values. We primed participants by having them perform either a probability calculation task or a memory task between decision blocks.
This manipulation is conceptually similar to that used by Ferreira et al. We hypothesized that the probability calculation task would prime participants to carefully evaluate the values within each decision prompt. Alternatively, the memory task did not direct participants to process information relevant for unbiased decision making.
Rather, participants were instructed to remember the initial endowments in each decision trial. Neither the probability calculation task nor the memory task directly referenced the framing choices. We predicted that the framing effect would be eliminated in both older and younger adults in the probability calculation condition. Further, we expected to see a framing effect in both age groups in the memory task condition. Older participants were recruited from the older adult participant pool maintained by the Department of Psychology at Tufts University.
Older participants were those that presented as cognitively healthy, not suffering from mood disorders, and not presently taking medication that might interfere with cognitive functioning. Younger participants were recruited through an internet posting. All younger adults were enrolled as Tufts undergraduate students. The older adults did not differ on level of education or vocabulary score Salthouse, from the younger adults. Twenty-eight monetary decision prompts were developed for Experiment 1.
Decision prompts used in Experiments 1 and 2 are presented in the Appendix. A certain bet was a fixed gain or loss of a particular dollar value, whereas a risky bet had two possible outcomes: either a a gain or loss of greater value than that of the certain bet or b no change from the initial award.
You now have the choice between: a. In total, decision trials included 14 gain-framed and 14 loss-framed scenarios. For gain-framed prompts, each choice was worded as money to be added to the initial dollar award, whereas for loss-framed prompts each choice was worded as money to be subtracted from the award. Prompts were developed such that the 14 gain-framed prompted had the same expected values as the 14 loss-framed prompts.
That is, for every loss-framed prompt, there was a gain-framed prompt of corresponding level of risk and expected outcome. The decision prompts were presented in a fixed random order to control for frame ordering and to prevent any prompt from being presented in succession with its opposite-frame counterpart. Participants in the probability task condition solved fractional multiplication problems after the presentation of four decision trials. In this task, participants completed four multiplication problems, each one multiplying an integer by a ratio i.
Integers and ratios from each problem corresponded to values in the decision trial prompts; however the decision task was not directly referenced. Participants in the memory task condition recalled initial dollar awards for each decision made on the previous four decision trials.
Further, both younger and older adults performed at ceiling on these tasks. The main dependent variable was the percentage of risky bets selected. Specifically, for each of the 24 experimental decision prompts, participants chose between a sure bet or a gamble. Participants were not paid according to their choices. The task was hypothetical. The proportion of risky choices made within each of the frame conditions gains or losses was calculated for each participant and served as the primary dependent variable.
We also measured response time for judgments made. Upon entering the lab, participants signed an informed consent form and then completed a brief vocabulary test. To indirectly encourage specific cognitive processes, after participants completed four decision trials, they performed either the memory task or the probability calculation task.
The first 4 decision trials and first prompt for the accompanying processing task served as a practice block. We analyzed data from the 24 decision trials that occurred after the practice block. Older adults were more likely to select the risky choice when decisions were framed in terms of losses as compared with younger adults.
As Table 1 illustrates, older adults in the memory condition were more susceptible to the framing effect, demonstrating greater risk seeking behavior when presented with loss trials, as compared with younger adults in that same condition. Hoque, M. South Asian J. Jacowitz, K. Measures of anchoring in estimation tasks. Jin, H. Food Policy 44, 95— Kim, D. A trust-based consumer decision-making model in electronic commerce: the role of trust, perceived risk, and their antecedents.
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Food Prod. In other words, overvaluing how something is said its framing can cause us to undervalue what is being said, which is usually more important. As a result, we may choose worse options that are more effectively framed over better options or information that is framed badly.
This holds true in the smaller decisions we make as consumers and citizens, as well as more significant decisions in our personal and professional lives. However, we should also be aware of this effect because it can be harnessed to our advantage.
Understanding that people are influenced by framing can make us focus on how we present information we want others to accept and act on. Knowing that people are drawn to framing that highlights certain gains can help us present our work in this fashion, making it more attractive and effective. When managing or collaborating with other people, it is important to remember the importance of how we present our message or position.
More effective framing may allow us to better leverage our point of view. Think about the metaphor behind the concept. A frame focuses attention on the painting it surrounds. Different frames draw out different aspects of the work.
Putting a painting in a red frame brings out the red in the work; putting the same painting in a blue frame brings out the blue. How someone frames an issue influences how others see it and focuses their attention on particular aspects of it. Framing is the essence of targeting a communication to a specific audience. There are a few strategies for reducing the framing effect. Involvement can be thought of as how invested you are in an issue.
What we can take from these findings, is that we should think through our choices concerning an issue and try to become more informed on it. A more specific strategy that falls in line with this more general approach is to provide rationales for our choices. A study found this reduced framing effects in participants as it forced them to engage in more detailed mental processing.
In this study, Tversky and Kahneman asked participants to decide between two treatments for people who contracted a fatal disease.
This was done with either positive framing how many people would live or negative framing how many people would die. This demonstrated that the choices we make are also influenced by the way they are framed. Framing effects have been shown to influence legal proceedings. A paper written in by Stephanos Bibas, a U. Defendants with a loss frame see acquittal as the baseline, and anything worse than this as a loss.
Bibas believes this advantages prosecutors, as defendants often stand to gain from concessions and bargaining. However, he goes on to claim that some defendants see plea bargains through the lens of gains. The study was composed of two groups of participants: the first group was made up of healthy volunteers, and the other of cancer patients. Both groups were asked to choose between two cancer treatment options. The first treatment option was toxic, while the second was non-toxic but less effective than the toxic option.
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